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Roles and Responsibilities in Cyberspace
The theme of the 2014 Tallinn Papers is ‘Roles and Responsibilities in Cyberspace’. 
Strategic developments in cyber security have often been frustrated by role assignment, 
whether in a domestic or international setting. The difficulty extends well beyond the 
formal distribution of roles and responsibilities between organisations and agencies. 
Ascertaining appropriate roles and responsibilities is also a matter of creating an 
architecture that is responsive to the peculiar challenges of cyberspace and that best 
effectuates strategies that have been devised to address them. 
The 2014 Tallinn Papers address the issue from a variety of perspectives. Some of the 
articles tackle broad strategic questions like deliberating on the stance NATO should 
adopt in cyberspace matters, or exploring the role small states can play in this domain. 
Others touch upon narrower topics, such as the right to privacy in the growingly intrusive 
national security context and whether software manufacturers should be compelled to 
bear their burden of cyber security by making them liable for faulty software. The thread 
running through all the papers, however, is their future-looking approach, one designed 
to inspire discussion and undergird strategic development.
Submissions
The Tallinn Papers is a peer reviewed publication of the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence. Although submissions are primarily commissioned by-
invitation, proposals consistent with the annual theme and dealing with issues of strategic 
importance will be considered on an exceptional basis. Since the Tallinn Papers are 
meant for a wide audience, such proposals should assume no prior specialised knowledge 
on the part of the readership. Authors wishing to submit a proposal may contact the 
Editor-in-Chief at publications@ccdcoe.org.
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The Nature of International Law Cyber 
Norms 
Michael N. Schmitt1 and Liis Vihul2
As with all human activity, that which takes place in cyberspace is shaped by 
a normative architecture consisting of related, but distinct, regimes. In the 
contemporary environment, policy norms loom largest, as illustrated by the 
issuance of national “cyber strategies”3 and the work of intergovernmental 
bodies such as the United Nations.4 Yet, other normative regimes are also 
beginning to influence the development of said architecture, as demonstrated 
by the fervent debates in the field of ethics over the proper balance between 
cyber security and cyber privacy, the ever-growing body of domestic legislation 
to govern intrastate cyber activities, and the increasing trend in favour of setting 
common technical standards to foster interoperability. 
This article explores the nature, formation and evolution of international legal 
norms pertaining to cyber activities. At present, it is fair to say that this category 
of norms operates in the shadow of most others, a situation often attributed to the 
alleged paucity of international law applicable in cyberspace. After all, very few 
1 Senior Fellow and Director, “Tallinn 2.0” Project, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence; Charles H. Stockton Professor and Director, Stockton Center for the Study of 
International Law, United States Naval War College; Professor of Public International Law, 
Exeter University; Fellow, Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed 
Conflict. This article draws upon earlier research published as: Michael N. Schmitt & Liis 
Vihul, ‘The Emergence of Legal Norms for Cyber Conflict’, in Binary Bullets: The Ethics of 
Cyberwarfare (Fritz Allhoff, Adam Henschke & Bradley Jay Strawser, Oxford University Press, 
2015). The views expressed are those of the authors in their personal capacity and do not 
necessarily reflect those of any institution with which they are affiliated.
2 Researcher and Project Manager, “Tallinn 2.0” Project, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence.
3 See, e.g., White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace, May 11, 2011, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf. 
For a compilation of national cyber strategies, see http://www.ccdcoe.org/strategies-policies.
html.
4 See, e.g., the summary of work under the auspices of the United Nations at United 
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of Information Security, http://www.un.org/
disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/. For a catalogue of international organisations’ 
developments in the cyber sphere, see http://www.ccdcoe.org/incyder.html.
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express cyber-specific rules of international law exist. However, such assertions 
display a misunderstanding of the content and operation of international law 
that this article is, in part, designed to alleviate.
Analysis will begin by introducing and situating the different types of legal 
norms in the international law framework. The inquiry’s foundational premise 
is that the rules of international law governing cyber activities are identical to 
those applicable to other types of conduct. Any differences in their explication 
and application are the product of the unique nature of cyber activities, not a 
variation in the legal strictures that shape their content and usage.
The article will then briefly discuss certain terminology that has befuddled 
discussions about international law cyber norms. This brief detour is 
essential because the divergent language employed by the legal and non-legal 
communities is a source of much confusion in discourse about the relevant 
norms. Such dialogue is also often obfuscated by improper reference to various 
norms that reside in different fields of international law that are not on point in 
a particular case. Experience has demonstrated that an understanding of the key 
legal terminology is a precondition to any meaningful interchange between the 
various normative communities.
With the groundwork laid for substantive analysis of international legal norms, 
the article turns to how they emerge, are interpreted, and develop through time. 
Although the analysis applies to international law generally, emphasis will be 
placed on two bodies of international law: that governing when states may 
resort to force (the jus ad bellum) and that applying during an armed conflict 
(international humanitarian law). This is because it is in these legal regimes 
that the law, or at least contemporary understanding of the law, applicable to 
cyberspace is most developed. This reality is primarily the product of the Tallinn 
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare5 that was produced under 
the auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
(NATO CCD COE) between 2010 and 2013. Comprehension of how other 
areas of international law apply to cyber activities is far less mature, a situation 
being addressed by the NATO CCD COE in its ongoing “Tallinn 2.0” project. 6
Since legal norms reside in treaties or are found in customary international 
law, the examination will proceed by addressing each source of law separately, 
5 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare [hereinafter Tallinn Manual ], 
gen. ed. Michael N. Schmitt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
6 On the project, see NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence website, http://
ccdcoe.org/research.html.
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first in the abstract and then in its cyber context. Dividing the discussion of 
international law in this manner is useful because cyberspace poses different 
challenges to the formation, identification and application of each of these two 
sources of international law. General principles of law, which form the third 
source of international law, are unlikely to significantly inform the contours 
of international law directly applicable to cyberspace. They will therefore be 
addressed only briefly, before turning to the authors’ final reflections on the 
subject.
The Nature and Place of International Legal Norms 
Any consideration of the international community’s legal architecture, including 
that applicable to activities in cyberspace, necessarily begins with Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.7 
Although situated in the constitutive document of a single international 
tribunal, the article, which tracks the formulation found in the 1920 statute of its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice,8 is today universally 
accepted as accurately setting forth the three forms of international law – treaty 
law, customary law and general principles of law. Subparagraph (d) delineates 
the two secondary sources used to elucidate that law: judicial decisions and the 
work of distinguished scholars.9 It must be cautioned that secondary sources are 
not in themselves law. In particular, and unlike the practice in many domestic 
jurisdictions, the decisions of tribunals are binding only on the parties before the 
court, a fact codified in Article 59 of the Statute. Nevertheless, such decisions 
7 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 UNTS 993 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
8 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 38, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 LNTS 379.
9 See, e.g., Oppenheim’s International Law, I, 24 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996).
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and scholarly works are highly persuasive in interpreting treaty provisions 
and identifying customary law. Indeed, considering the lack of cyber-specific 
customary and treaty law, scholarly works such as the Tallinn Manual are proving 
instrumental in identifying and shaping international legal cyber norms. So too 
is the case law of international judicial bodies, a fact illustrated by the frequent 
reference herein to their pronouncements.
International legal norms differ from other inter-state norms regulating cyber 
behaviour in the sense that in the event of non-compliance, international legal 
responsibility results.10 The essence of this responsibility lies in the obligation 
to stop on-going violations and to provide reparations to the injured states for 
the harm caused. It is therefore important to carefully distinguish legal norms 
from non-binding norms. For instance, a “code of conduct”, like that proposed 
by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,11 seldom qualifies as international 
law because it is aspirational or exhortational in nature, but not compulsory. 
Codes of conduct or statements of best practice are not binding on states in 
the same manner as legal norms, and their violation does not involve the same 
remedies. While the sanctioning of violations of international legal norms is 
complicated by the general absence of a compulsory enforcement mechanism, 
states are nevertheless significantly more reluctant to breach legal, as opposed 
to other, types of norms. 
Traditionally, norms of international law were viewed as binding only on states. It 
was left to individual states to address the conduct of individuals and organisations 
that fell under their personal jurisdiction when engaged in activities that were 
within their subject matter competency. Although international law continues 
to primarily govern international relations between states, in the last century it 
has increasingly come to address individual conduct. Classic examples include 
international legal norms that permit universal jurisdiction over certain acts 
such as war crimes. Nevertheless, to amount to international law, all such norms 
must be agreed to by multiple states, either through treaty or the development of 
customary law. In this sense, international law is at its core a body of compulsory 
norms involving two or more states.
10 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 1, Rep. 
of the Int’l L. Comm’n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 
(2001), reprinted in [2001] Yearbook of the International Law Commission 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility].
11 Letter dated 12 September 2011 From the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General, Annex, UN Doc. A/66/359 (Sept. 14, 2011).
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As noted above, there are three forms of international law – treaty law, customary 
law and general principles of law. Customary law is unwritten international law 
that develops over time and is based on state practice. Although unwritten, it 
binds all states, except those that fall into a very specific and narrow category 
of “persistent objector”. Treaties, by which states expressly agree to be bound in 
law, may be bilateral (two states) or multinational (more than two parties), and 
treaty law may be coterminous with customary law in the sense that a treaty’s 
provisions simply reflect customary law, or have come to reflect customary law 
that has subsequently emerged. However, conceptually it is useful to think of 
treaty law as consisting of express agreements that either recognise customary 
norms or create new legal norms that render an act or failure to act unlawful for 
the parties to the treaty. This latter point is key since the status of the customary 
law governing cyber activities remains rather unsettled. 
A state may even consent by treaty to certain conduct that would otherwise 
constitute a violation of a customary norm, unless the customary norm is of jus 
cogens character, such as the prohibition on genocide which states may never agree 
to violate in their relations. For instance, although certain intrusions by a state 
into another state’s cyber infrastructure may amount to a violation of the latter’s 
sovereignty, that state may execute a bilateral or multilateral treaty that permits 
other states to do so in certain circumstances, such as during joint counter-
terrorism operations. Additionally, a state may acquiesce to such a violation on 
an ad hoc basis, as when it has information that its cyber infrastructure is being 
used for criminal purposes, but lacks the ability to address the situation itself. 
International law is typically described as prohibitory in nature: any activity 
that is not disallowed is generally permitted.12 But even when law does exist, 
it may prove lacking when meeting unanticipated circumstances and thus is 
occasionally breached as part of the process of creating a new norm. Indeed, 
it is often said that customary law norms are “made in the breach”. By way 
of illustration, it may be that pre-existing human rights law would, if logically 
applied in the cyber context, prohibit intrusions into certain forms of cyber 
communications between individuals. However, if states treat this customary 
norm as inconsistent with their need to ensure, for instance, the security of their 
cyber systems, they may begin to act contrary to the norm. Over time, their state 
practice, could, as will be explained, be viewed by states as legal, such that the 
original human rights norm will have been modified. Given the novelty of cyber 
activities, they are particularly vulnerable to this dynamic of customary law.
12 S.S. ‘Lotus’ (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 3, 18 (Sept. 7).
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Once the international law boundaries of conduct are demarcated, domestic 
legal, political (policy), ethical and other norms can operate to further restrict 
or require particular conduct in cyberspace. For instance, while it is unclear 
precisely how international human rights norms in the realm of privacy restrict 
state monitoring of personal cyber communications, monitoring may constitute 
a violation of domestic constitutional law or be contrary to state policy or 
the ethical benchmarks that a state has adopted. Thus, international legal 
norms merely define the space within which states may engage in normative 
construction. Of course, states may act to transform these non-legal norms into 
those with legal authority by adopting a treaty incorporating them or engaging 
in state practice that crystallises over time, as described below, into customary 
law. 
Terminological Precision
To avoid cross-disciplinary confusion in understanding how legal norms are 
created for, and applied to, cyber activities, it is first necessary to grasp the 
relevant legal vocabulary. Indeed, perhaps the greatest hindrance to effective 
conversation between cyber norm communities is terminological in nature. To 
cite a simple but pervasive example, non-lawyers tend to speak of “cyber war” in 
a generic sense as encompassing all forms of hostile cyber activities conducted 
by or against states and use the term “cyber attacks” as referring to any harmful 
cyber operations. However, as will be seen, these terms do not formally reside in 
international law. Instead, international law uses a patois that employs the same 
words – attack and war – but has a discrete normative implication. 
Of greatest significance in this regard are the legal terms of art populating the 
jus ad bellum and international humanitarian law (IHL). The jus ad bellum deals 
with the prohibition of the use of force found in Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter and customary law, as well as the law of self-defence set forth in 
Article 51 and its customary law counterpart.13 In contrast, IHL deals with how 
force may be employed by the parties to an armed conflict. IHL, in particular 
customary international law and the Geneva Conventions with their 1977 
13 UN Charter, arts. 2(4) & 51.
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Additional Protocols,14 contains, inter alia, the rules governing attacks, delineates 
protections to which certain persons and objects are entitled, and restricts the 
kinds of weapons that may be employed in order to conduct hostilities.
With respect to the jus ad bellum, the primary terminological obstacle deals with 
the use of the word “attack”. Article 51 of the UN Charter allows states to 
use force in self-defence in situations amounting to an “armed attack”. Not all 
hostile cyber operations directed at a state rise to this level. As a general matter 
(the precise threshold is by no means settled), such operations must result in the 
destruction of property or injury to persons before qualifying as an armed attack 
that opens the door to a forceful response, whether kinetic or cyber in nature.15 
Thus, for the legal community, the term “cyber attack” in this context refers to 
a particularly egregious hostile cyber operation that allows for the most robust 
of state responses. To style operations of lesser consequences as “attacks” often 
results in the various normative communities talking past each other.
In IHL, there are two consistently pernicious terminological quagmires. The 
first involves use of the word “war”, as in “cyber war”. War is a historical term 
that no longer enjoys the normative meaning associated with it for centuries, 
when the fact that states were “at war” or had engaged in an “act of war” meant 
that certain bodies of law, such as the law of war and neutrality law, applied. 
Since the mid-twentieth century the term has been obsolete in international law. 
It was intentionally discarded by the international community in lieu of “armed 
conflict” in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.16 This was done to emphasise 
that international humanitarian law applies irrespective of a declaration of war 
or other legalistic formalities. Henceforth, the determination that states were “at 
war” (involved in an armed conflict) would be factual. 
It is clear that when cyber operations accompany kinetic hostilities qualifying 
14 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed 
Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 
12, 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 
12, 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.
15 Tallinn Manual, supra note 5, r. 13 and accompanying commentary.
16 Geneva Conventions I – IV, supra note 14, arts. 2 & 3.
The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms
8
as armed conflict (as with the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 or 
that taking place in Syria at the time of writing), IHL applies fully to all the 
cyber operations that have a nexus to the conflict, whether they are launched 
by states, non-state groups or individual hackers. For instance, in the same way 
that IHL prohibits injurious or destructive kinetic attacks against civilians and 
civilian objects, it likewise prohibits cyber attacks against them having the same 
effects.17
For international lawyers the term “cyber war” is better rendered as “cyber 
armed conflict”. When non-lawyers speak of the norms applicable in cyber war, 
the lawyer will accordingly insist on examining the attendant circumstances, 
because only if they qualify as armed conflict will the specific international law 
norms applicable therein attach. Otherwise, the situation will be subject to those 
aspects of international law that apply during peacetime, such as the law of state 
responsibility and human rights law.
The second term that causes confusion between the normative communities is, 
again, “attack”. As noted, “armed attack” is a legal term of art in the jus ad bellum. 
Yet, “attack” is also a legal term of art in IHL. The term does not simply refer to 
military operations directed by one belligerent against another during an armed 
conflict. Rather, it is defined in Article 49 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or 
in defence.”18 The Tallinn Manual accordingly defines a cyber attack as “a cyber 
operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause 
injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.”19 
The definition of an “attack” lies at the core of IHL, because many of its 
prohibitions are framed in terms of prohibition of attacks, the paradigmatic 
examples being those on directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects.20 
To the extent that a cyber operation does not qualify as an attack in the IHL 
regime, the prohibitions are inapplicable. Consequently, when a non-lawyer 
uses the term “cyber attack”, clarification must be sought (in addition to the jus 
ad bellum issue outlined above) not only as to whether the operation occurred 
during an armed conflict such that IHL applies, but also whether the operation 
constitutes an attack such that IHL prohibitions and restrictions come into play.
Clearly, terminological indistinctness and imprecision have long hobbled 
17 Tallinn Manual, supra note 5, rr. 32 & 37.
18 Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 49(1).
19 Tallinn Manual, supra note 5, r. 30.
20 See the various prohibitions set forth in Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, part. IV.
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interdisciplinary understanding between the legal and non-legal communities; 
they continue to do so today. A proper grasp of the international law governing 
cyber operations, and its likely future evolution, demands terminological 
fastidiousness. It is to that law that we now turn.
General Rules Governing Treaty Law 
As noted, international legal norms bearing on cyber activities take two forms, 
the most commonly recognised by the non-legal community being treaty law. 
A treaty is an international agreement governed by international law.21 Such 
agreements adopt many titles – protocol, agreement, convention, act, etc. So 
long as the parties to the agreement intended to create legally binding rights and 
obligations for themselves, the instrument’s precise appellation is of no legal 
significance.22 
The law that applies to the formation, application, and interpretation of an 
international agreement is identical irrespective of its subject matter. The law 
governing treaties is in great part captured in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.23 While some states, such as the United States, are not party 
to the Convention, most of its provisions are viewed as reflective of customary 
international law, a topic examined below. 
Of particular note in the cyber context is the principle that treaties are governed 
exclusively by international law, except in cases where the agreement itself refers 
to domestic law. The fact that a state’s domestic law or even constitutional law 
disallows an action required by a treaty – or demands one prohibited by a treaty 
– does not excuse a state’s non-compliance with the terms of the treaty. Indeed, 
a state may refuse to enforce an international law norm in its courts on the 
basis of domestic legal concerns, such as constitutional law. In states such as the 
United States that do not accept the supremacy of international over domestic 
law, doing so is sometimes domestically required by law. However, the violation 
by that state of the international legal norm remains a breach of international 
law attributable to the state.
Once a treaty has been successfully negotiated, states subsequently consent to 
be bound by it, which may occur through a number of means. Consent may be 
indicated through signature (but not in every case, since signature sometimes 
21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
22 Id., art. 2(1)(a).
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21.
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denotes only adoption), exchange of instruments, ratification, accession, or any 
other means that the parties agree upon.24 State representatives sometimes sign 
treaties subject to ratification. In the United States, for instance, treaty-making 
power is vested in the President, but is subject to the “advice and consent” of 
the Senate.25 In such a case, the state only becomes bound once the instrument 
is ratified. A state may also “accede” to a treaty when it did not participate in the 
negotiations leading to its adoption. Finally, a treaty usually specifies a particular 
date of its entry into force or includes a provision requiring a particular number 
of states to ratify the treaty before it comes into effect.26 
These procedural requirements are important with respect to the application 
and evolution of legal norms, because it is not unusual for a treaty to be adopted 
and ratified by some states long before it comes into force. For instance, the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court27 was adopted in 1998, but 
only came into force when 60 states had ratified it, which did not happen 
until 2002. Pending a treaty coming into force, states that have signed it or 
otherwise expressed an intent to eventually be bound by it may not engage in 
activities that would defeat the treaty’s object and purpose, unless they formally 
provide notification of their decision to not become a party thereto,28 as was 
the case with the United States and the International Criminal Court Statute in 
2002.29 Accordingly, the fact that a treaty has not yet come into effect does not 
preclude it from having some normative significance. For instance, 89 states 
signed the 2012 International Telecommunication Regulations Treaty30 at the 
World Conference on International Telecommunications in Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates. They must act in accordance with the treaty’s object and purpose 
despite the fact that it will only come into effect on January 1, 2015.
States occasionally issue reservations to multilateral treaties when they consent 
to be bound by them.31 Reservations act to exclude or modify treaty provisions 
24 Id., arts. 11-15.
25 US Const. art. II, sect. 2, cl. 2.
26 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 24.
27 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 18.
29 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, International 
Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, May 6, 2002, http://2001-2009.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
30 International Telecommunication Regulations, Dec. 9, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 13, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 19.
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with respect to the state concerned.32 Some treaties prohibit reservations 
altogether. Even when allowed, reservations cannot be inconsistent with the 
object and purpose of the treaty. If a state reserves, and another state accepts the 
reservation, the exclusion or modification of the provision in question operates 
with respect to the obligations of both states. Should a party to the treaty 
object to the reservation, the reservation will not come into effect between the 
parties concerned. An objecting state may also determine that a reservation is 
so objectionable that the treaty is not in force at all between it and the reserving 
state. It should be evident that reservations to a multilateral treaty can create an 
extremely complex maze of legal relationships. 
In addition to reservations, states may issue interpretative declarations that 
clarify their position with regard to a particular provision of the treaty or 
to how the treaty will be applied by the states concerned. Declarations have 
no technical legal effect on the state’s rights or obligations. However, states 
sometimes make interpretative declarations that de facto amount to reservations. 
For example, the United Kingdom has issued a statement concerning the 
prohibitions on reprisals set forth in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.33 The declaration arguably denudes certain provisions of their 
effect. Thus, declarations, like reservations, must always be carefully surveyed 
when evaluating the actual normative reach of a treaty. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of treaty law deals with interpretation, as 
a treaty’s text may be vague or ambiguous. Such ambiguity is often the only 
way the parties involved were able to achieve sufficient consensus to adopt the 
instrument. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that treaties 
“shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and 
purpose.”34 The term “context” refers to the other text of the treaty, as well as 
to any agreement between the parties made at the conclusion of the treaty.35 In 
addition to context, interpretation of a treaty’s provision should take account 
of any subsequent express agreement between parties as to its meaning, as well 
as “subsequent practice in its application that establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation.”36 If the meaning of a provision remains 
ambiguous, reference may be made to the “preparatory work of the treaty 
32 Id., art. 2(1)(d).
33 UK Ministry of Defence, Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 422-23 (2005).
34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31(1).
35 Id., art. 31(2).
36 Id., art. 31(3).
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and the circumstances of its conclusion.”37 In other words, it is appropriate to 
explore what was in the mind of the parties at the time when the agreement was 
negotiated and adopted. 
Treaty Law in the Cyber Context
Given that cyber activities are relatively new, very few treaties deal directly 
with them. Prominent contemporary examples include the Convention on 
Cybercrime,38 its 2006 Additional Protocol,39 the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation’s International Information Security Agreement,40 and the 
ITU Constitution and Convention41 and International Telecommunication 
Regulations.42 The rules regarding treaties apply fully to each of these 
instruments and others that exist or are to be adopted in the future. Since it is 
not the purpose here to examine their substantive content, it suffices to recall 
that when considering the formation, interpretation and application of cyber 
treaty norms, the key guidance is to be found in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties and in the customary law of treaties. 
In light of the paucity of cyber-specific treaties, the threshold question is, of 
course, whether non-cyber-specific instruments even apply to cyber activities. 
A number of states, including Russia and China, have previously expressed 
some reluctance to acknowledge that existing international agreements extend 
to cyberspace.43 This disinclination seems to have been partially overcome in 
37 Id., art. 32.
38 Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 UNTS 167.
39 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts 
of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, Jan. 28, 2003, ETS 
No. 189.
40 Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, 61st Plenary 
Meeting, Dec. 2, 2008.
41 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Dec. 22, 1992, 
1825 UNTS 330.
42 International Telecommunication Regulations, Dec. 9, 1988, deposited with the International 
Telecommunication Union Secretary-General. The International Telecommunication 
Regulations, as well as the Radio Regulations, are a legal instrument of the ITU (see 
Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, art. 4(3)).
43 As an example, Russia has put forward arguments that instead of regulating cyber armed conflict 
through IHL, it should be outlawed altogether. On this point, as well as for a comprehensive 
overview of Russia’s views on cyber-conflict, see Keir Giles & Andrew Monaghan, Legality 
in Cyberspace: An adversary view 12 (2014), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/
display.cfm?pubID=1193.
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2013 with the publication of the UN Group of Governmental Experts” (GGE) 
report, which found that “[i]nternational law, and in particular the Charter of the 
United Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability 
and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment.”44 
The report also confirmed the appropriateness of the law of sovereignty 
and of state responsibility in the context of cyber security.45 Both Russia and 
China were represented in the group. Interestingly, and unfortunately, a draft 
provision verbatim endorsing IHL’s applicability was removed in order to secure 
unanimity. However, even beyond the Euro-Atlantic community, many states 
have publicly confirmed that IHL applies to cyber activities associated with an 
armed conflict.46 There appears to be no serious opposition to the notion in 
academia.47
Considering the broad acceptance of the premise that non-cyber-specific treaty 
law can apply to cyberspace, an array of international agreements that govern 
state activities in general also constrain cyber activities. As an example, the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention delineates the type of activities that the vessels of 
one state may engage in while in the territorial sea of another state.48 Although 
the vessels have a right of passage though the territorial sea, the passage must 
be “innocent”, that is, not be contrary to the interests of the coastal nation. 
Conducting cyber operations against the coastal state from aboard naval vessels 
would consequently violate the innocent passage regime for states party to 
the Convention, even though that treaty was adopted well before the advent 
44 Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/68/98, 
June 24, 2013, http://undocs.org/A/68/98.
45 Id., paras. 20-23. 
46 See, e.g., Information Security Policy Council, Japan, International Strategy on 
Cybersecurity Cooperation 9 (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/pdf/
InternationalStrategyonCybersecurityCooperation_e.pdf; Australian Department of Defence, 
White Paper 21 (2013), http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.
pdf; Republic of Korea, Report to the United Nations Secretary General 1 (2014), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ROK.pdf (welcoming the 
report of the 3rd UN Group of Governmental Experts, “including the agreement that existing 
international law is applicable in cyberspace”); Georgia, Report to the United Nations Secretary 
General 5 (2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/
Georgia.pdf.
47 The International Committee of the Red Cross has endorsed the same view. ICRC, 
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts 37, 
Doc. 31IC/11/5.1.2, Oct. 31, 2011.
48 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 17-19, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397.
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of sea-based cyber operations. Similarly, the 1963 Moon Treaty provides that 
the Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used for “exclusively peaceful 
purposes”.49 Therefore, military cyber operations may not be launched from the 
moon or other celestial bodies, again despite the fact that the treaty predates 
the technical capability to do so. In Europe, the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights (in effect since 1953) is playing a prominent role in privacy and 
data protection debates involving cyber communications that its drafters could 
not have envisaged.50
It is, however, in the realm of treaty law dealing with the jus ad bellum and IHL 
that non-cyber-specific treaties are presently playing the most prominent role. 
This is because of the relative maturity of these bodies of law as compared 
to certain others that are implicated by cyber operations, such as the law of 
state responsibility. Additionally, cyber legal issues logically first attracted the 
attention of lawyers involved in military affairs, as it is primarily the military that 
plans, develops and executes cyber operations. Since these lawyers’ training and 
experience is in conflict law, the evolutionary development of legal scholarship 
in conflict law before that in other fields of international law is understandable. 
Therefore, as of now, the normative regimes of the jus ad bellum and IHL offer 
the most fertile ground for examining how non-cyber-specific treaty law applies 
in the cyber context. It is certainly with respect to them that the discourse is 
most mature.
Central among these treaties are the UN Charter with respect to jus ad bellum, and 
the 1949 Geneva Protocols and their 1977 Additional Protocols in IHL. Given 
the general applicability of these instruments to cyber conflict, the key issue is 
how their norms are to be interpreted in the cyber context. This was the focus of 
inquiry by the International Group of Experts that prepared the Tallinn Manual. 
Although the Tallinn Manual embraces the premise of complete applicability of 
jus ad bellum and IHL norms,51 it is replete with examples of circumstances in 
which the experts could not achieve consensus on their precise interpretation 
with respect to cyber operations. Accordingly, the manual often refers to 
majority and minority views among them. To ensure comprehensiveness, on 
49 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. 
IV, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 UNTS 3.
50 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 UNTS 222.
51 Tallinn Manual, supra note 5, at 3, 13. The role of human rights law is especially complicated 
because not all states take the same approach with respect to the extraterritoriality of treaty-
based human rights norms. The United States, for instance, has historically taken the position 
that they do not apply extraterritorially.
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numerous occasions the manual even acknowledges the existence of reasonable 
interpretations not supported by any member of the group.52 
As became clear during the Tallinn Manual drafting process, the object and 
purpose of treaties enjoys particular significance when interpreting existing 
treaties in the context of new areas of activity such as cyber conflict. This is 
particularly so because the activities in question were in most cases beyond 
the contemplation of those drafting these treaties. Therefore, when applying 
their provisions to cyber operations, it is necessary to examine the foundational 
rationale underlining them, both generally and with regard to any individual 
provision in question.
Four prominent examples illustrate the significance of treaty interpretation, as 
well as its shortcomings, in the cyber context. The first deals with the meaning of 
the term “use of force” in the UN Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibition thereof. The 
object and purpose of the provision was self-evidently to limit the circumstances 
in which states might resort to force to resolve their differences. All of the 
Tallinn Manual experts agreed that a cyber operation by one state against another 
that causes injury or death to individuals, or damage or destruction to property, 
qualifies as a use of force. However, no consensus could be reached on the 
exact threshold at which a cyber activity crosses into the use of force. The 
International Group of Experts could only offer indicative factors that states 
are likely to consider when deciding how to legally characterise a cyber operation 
in this respect.53 Delineations of factors should prove useful as states estimate 
how their activities will be seen by other states, as well as when they assess the 
actions of other states against the norm, but they are not legal criteria per se. The 
object and purpose of Article 2(4) provided a guide to interpretation in the cyber 
context, but not a fully comprehensive one.
Second, Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that states may use force in 
response to an “armed attack”. Here, the object and purpose was to ensure that 
states did not remain normatively defenceless should the enforcement regime 
established in the Charter fail to operate as planned. But the interpretation of 
this article remains a source of some uncertainty and controversy because it 
is unclear whether the right of self-defence extends to attacks conducted by 
non-state actors, or whether states are limited to law enforcement measures in 
52 See, e.g., acknowledgement of a view by which the gap between the thresholds of a “use of 
force” and an “armed attack” is either so narrow as to be insignificant or non-existent, but 
which was not shared by any member of the International Group of Experts. Id., para. 7 of 
commentary to r. 11.
53 Id., paras. 8-10 of commentary to r. 11.
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responding to such hostile acts. This is an issue that was brought to the forefront 
of international law debate in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks against the 
United States by al Qaeda. It is a central one with respect to cyberspace, because 
a non-state group’s or individual’s capability to launch a hostile cyber operation 
at a state at the armed attack level is much more likely in the cyber context than 
the kinetic, due to the relative ease of acquiring the expertise and equipment for 
a cyber armed attack compared to a kinetic one.54 
Recently, both the United States and the Netherlands have taken the position 
that defensive use of force in the cyber context is permissible under Article 
51 even if a cyber-attack by a non-state actor cannot be attributed to another 
state.55 Those states and commentators who take the more restrictive approach 
in applying Article 51 to terrorist strikes would likely be at least as restrictive 
when considering cyber operations mounted by non-state actors. This illustrates 
that difficulties in interpreting treaty law in the non-cyber context are highly 
likely to resurface in the cyber context. 
It is also unclear when a cyber operation is severe enough to be regarded as 
an armed attack in the sense of Article 51. According to the Tallinn Manual, 
operations causing significant damage, destruction, injury or death do qualify. 
Inclusion of such consequences is consistent with the UN Charter’s object and 
purpose of limiting the use of force in international relations, but consensus 
among the International Group of Experts stopped there; the group could not 
agree on any “bright line test” for determining when such harm is sufficiently 
54 The ICJ appears to have suggested that the article only applies in situations in which the 
activities concerned reach the level of intensity required for an armed attack and are either 
conducted “by or on behalf” of a state or with a state’s “substantial involvement”. Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 195 ( June 
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. However, contemporary state practice, most notably that since 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, appears to contradict this position. In particular, the international 
community unambiguously characterised the Al Qaeda attacks as triggering the United States’ 
inherent right of self-defence. The Security Council adopted numerous resolutions recognising 
the applicability of the right of self-defence to attacks by non-state actors. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1368, September 12, 2001; U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373, September 28, 2001. International 
organisations, including NATO, and many individual states took the same approach. See also 
Tallinn Manual, supra note 5, at 58.
55 Secretary General, Developments in the field of information and telecommunications 
in the context of international security, U.N. Doc. A/66/152, July 15, 2011, at 18; 
Netherlands Government Response to the AIV/CAVV Report on Cyber Warfare, http://
www.aiv-advies.nl/ContentSuite/template/aiv/adv/collection_single.asp?id=1942&adv_
id=3016&page=regeringsreacties&language=UK.
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“grave” to cross the armed attack threshold.56 Some experts took the position 
that the term should include operations that cause severe non-physical harm, 
such as cyber operations directed at crippling a state’s economy.57 Others resisted 
such a broad interpretation on the grounds that it ran counter to the Charter’s 
presumption in favour of non-forceful resolution of international disputes. 
Again, a reliable interpretation of a treaty provision in the cyber context proved 
elusive because multiple reasonable interpretations were possible.
The third and fourth examples derive from IHL. The paradigmatic interpretive 
hurdle in IHL is that cited above, the meaning of the word “attack”, which is 
found in various prohibitions set forth in Additional Protocol I. For instance, 
pursuant to express provisions of that treaty, it is unlawful to attack civilians, 
civilian objects, and certain other protected persons and objects.58 Additionally, 
states are required to consider expected collateral damage at the attack level when 
assessing the proportionality of their operations,59 and must take precautions to 
minimise such damage whenever they conduct attacks.60 Interpretation of the 
term “attack” in the cyber context is essential because, to the extent to which a 
cyber operation fails to qualify as an attack, these and related IHL provisions 
do not apply. 
Recall the Article 49 of Additional Protocol I definition of attack as an act of 
violence and the definition of cyber attack found in the Tallinn Manual as “a 
cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected 
to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.” All 
members of the International Group of Experts agreed that Additional Protocol 
I’s provisions referring to attacks included such cyber operations because they 
were violent in the sense of Article 49. However, members of the group differed 
on whether, and if so how far, the notion of violence should be stretched to 
include operations having non-kinetic effects. Some experts were of the view 
that the notion is strictly limited to cyber operations that cause physical damage 
or injury; other operations were not violent and therefore did not qualify as 
attacks. But a majority of them looked to the object and purpose of the Protocol 
and its relevant provisions to interpret the term more liberally as applying to a 
situation in which the functionality of an object is affected by a cyber operation 
56 Tallinn Manual, supra note 5, para. 6 of commentary to Rule 13, para. 8 of commentary to Rule 
11.
57 Id., para. 9 of commentary to Rule 13.
58 Additional Protocol I, supra note 14 arts. 51-56, 59. 
59 Id., arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).
60 Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 57.
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without physical damage having occurred. Illustrating the difficulties that 
attend the application of treaty provisions to situations that were not envisaged 
by the drafters, there were differences of opinion within the majority as to how 
“functionality” should be interpreted.61 As this example illustrates, layers of 
interpretation can exist. 
Finally, a similar IHL-based debate is underway as to whether the term “civilian 
object” extends to data.62 If so interpreted, a cyber operation designed to destroy 
civilian data would be prohibited by Article 52 of Additional Protocol I, which 
bans direct attacks against civilian objects. If not, civilian data is a lawful object 
of attack, except in those circumstances where its loss might cause physical 
damage to objects or injury to persons. The critical and unresolved fault line 
in the debate lies between interpretations that limit the term to entities that 
are tangible, which is arguably the plain meaning of the term “object”, and 
those based on the argument that in contemporary understanding the ordinary 
meaning of “object” includes data.63 
These examples illustrate that even strict application of the rules of treaty 
interpretation set out above fails to fully suffice in adding the requisite clarity 
when extant treaty provisions are applied to cyber activities. Such interpretive 
dilemmas are only likely to be resolved over time. Interpretive clarity will be 
fostered through the recurrent practice of states in application of the provisions 
in question, including when those states are acting in their capacity as members 
of international organisations like the United Nations, European Union 
and NATO. Also relevant will be state expressions of opinion as to proper 
interpretation of the terms and provisions in question. Recent examples include 
those proffered by former US Department of State legal adviser Harold Koh64 
and by the Dutch Government in response to the AIV report, both of which 
set forth state positions on the meaning of key aspects of relevant treaty law.65 
Judicial interpretation could potentially also shape the meaning of uncertain 
treaty norms in the cyber context, much as the judgments of the International 
61 Tallinn Manual, supra note 5, paras. 4, 10-12 of commentary accompanying r. 30. On the 
subject, see Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Rewired Warfare: Rethinking the Law of Cyber Attack’, 96 
International Review of the Red Cross (forthcoming 2014).
62 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘The Notion of ‘Objects’ during Cyber Operations: A Riposte in Defence 
of Interpretive Precision’, 48 Israel Law Review (forthcoming 2015).
63 Tallinn Manual, supra note 5, paras. 5 of commentary accompanying r. 38.
64 Harold H. Koh, Address at the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference, Ft. Meade, 
Maryland: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 2012), 54 Harvard International Law 
Journal Online 1 (2012).
65 Dutch Government Response, supra note 55.
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have added significant granularity 
to the understanding of IHL in its non-cyber guise. Finally, the work of scholars 
in the field cannot be understated, in light of the stark paucity of overt state 
practice and interpretive pronouncements on how treaty law applies to cyber 
situations. This dynamic is exemplified by the exceptional influence the Tallinn 
Manual is having on the formulation of state policies with regard to the respective 
treaty norms that bind them.
A persistent question is whether new treaties to address cyber activities are 
necessary or likely to materialise. Such treaty law would undoubtedly clear much 
of the normative fog that presently exists, yet new treaties are fairly unlikely 
for the foreseeable future. Historically, treaty law tends to emerge slowly. For 
example, despite a millennium of sea travel and commerce, it was not until 1958 
that a robust regime governing the law of the sea was codified in treaty form.66 
Similarly, although air warfare is over a century old, no treaty governing these 
operations exists. In both these examples, the lack of treaty law was addressed 
through the crystallisation of customary law norms. 
In this regard, treaties governing new technologies are often crafted only after 
the technologies have been used for some time and have revealed lacunae 
or insufficiencies in the existing law. The paradigmatic examples are the 
conventions governing weapons such as anti-personnel landmines and cluster 
munitions, which were concluded decades after the first employment of the 
weapons and which are still the subject of much controversy.67 
Although there are exceptions, the classic case being the adoption of space 
law treaties at the dawn of the space age, it must be remembered that treaties 
require the express consent of states. This poses numerous hurdles. First, all 
states are not similarly situated with respect to particular issues and, therefore, 
finding common ground on which states will agree to be bound can be difficult. 
This is certainly the case with cyber activities, in which some states are super-
empowered while others are novices. 
Second, in the early days of a new technology, states will be reluctant to bind 
themselves to particular rules until they fully understand how those rules 
may play out as the technology continues to develop. In particular, there is 
66 See, e.g., Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 UNTS 
205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 UST 2312, 450 UNTS 82.
67 For instance, the United States is not a party to either the Ottawa Convention on anti-
personnel mines or the Dublin Treaty on cluster munitions. In both cases, it took the position 
that the instruments run counter to operational needs.
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presently little support for proactively addressing cyber weaponry and cyber 
military operations. As with all other methods and means of warfare, states are 
hesitant to restrict the use of weapons that may afford them an advantage on the 
battlefield until they have sufficient experience to allow them to weigh the costs 
and benefits of prohibitions and limitations on their use.68
Third, to the extent that states wield cyber capabilities that are strategically or 
operationally useful, they have an incentive to retain the option of employing 
them. But those same states may be vulnerable to hostile operations by other states 
using similar capabilities. Therefore, it may be difficult for a state’s political and 
legal organs to agree on how the state should characterise a particular practice, 
as they may view the state’s national interests from different perspectives.
A fourth factor rendering cyber treaties unlikely in the near term is the difficulty 
of verifying compliance with their terms and effectively enforcing them. To 
begin with, it is sometimes difficult to even ascertain that harm is the result of 
a cyber operation. Not only are the technical challenges posed by attribution 
perplexing, but the law of attribution is complex.69 In other words, even when 
the originator of a cyber operation is known, it may be unclear whether his or 
her actions can be deemed to be those of a state as a matter of law such that the 
state is in violation of a treaty obligation.
Perhaps the prospect for evolution of cyber treaty norms was best set forth by 
the United Kingdom in its 2013 submission to the United Nations Secretary 
General:
“Experience in concluding these agreements on other subjects shows that they 
can be meaningful and effective only as the culmination of diplomatic attempts 
to develop shared understandings and approaches, not as their starting point. 
The United Kingdom believes that the efforts of the international community 
should be focused on developing common understandings on international law 
and norms rather than negotiating binding instruments that would only lead 
to the partial and premature imposition of an approach to a domain that is 
currently too immature to support it.”70
Even if states were to embark on multilateral diplomatic conferences with the 
68 As an example, the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare were never implemented in treaty form, 
in great part out of the uncertainty of states as to the role of air power in future conflicts.
69 On this topic, see, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, ‘Proxy Wars in Cyberspace: The 
Evolving International Law of Attribution’, 1:2 Fletcher Security Review 54 (2014).
70 ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of 
international security,’ 19, UN Doc. A/68/156, July 16, 2013, http://undocs.org/A/68/156.
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aim of concluding cyber treaties, any resulting treaty would likely be perforated 
with individual reservations, thereby degrading its practical effect. While the 
conclusion of uniform law treaties – those requiring states to harmonise their 
domestic legislation by adopting the same legal norms – is usually subject to less 
intense negotiation than, for instance, joint security treaties that impose cyber 
norms directly, in the cyber context even the former have proven difficult to 
agree on. As an example, despite determined international promotion, the 2001 
Convention on Cybercrime has been signed by only 53 states. Nine of them 
have yet to ratify the agreement71 and 22 reservations and 21 declarations have 
been attached by the states that are party to the Convention thus far. If this 
track record is illustrative, the prospects for crafting a meaningful legal regime 
specifically for cyber conflict are grim.
Customary International Law
The second form of international law recognised in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the ICJ is “general practice accepted as law”, or customary international law.72 It 
is a genre of norms unique to international law in the sense that it is unwritten. 
In many fields, such as the law of the sea, the jus ad bellum and IHL, customary 
international law was historically predominant; only in the 20th century did 
treaty law on these subjects come into its own.73 
Despite the proliferation of treaties in the last century, customary law retains its 
significance. In great part, this is because most treaty regimes are not universal. As 
an example, neither the United States nor Israel are party to the 1977 Additional 
Protocols, although both states have been involved in numerous conflicts since 
their adoption. To the extent that non-party states comply with the norms 
expressed in a treaty, they do so only on the basis that they reflect customary 
international law. Also note that rules expressed in a treaty sometimes crystallise 
into customary law, even though they did not mirror a customary norm at the 
time of adoption. The classic case is that of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 
71 For a list of signatories and ratifications, see Council of Europe website, http://conventions.coe.
int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG.
72 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
UNTS 993.
73 For instance, significant codification in the field occurred during the Hague Conferences of 
1899 and 1907. For a list of treaties, see International Committee of the Red Cross website, http://
www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByDate.xsp.
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Hague Convention IV.74 When a particular point encompassed in the material 
scope of an agreement is not directly addressed, any existing customary law will 
govern the matter.75
Although unwritten, customary law is as binding on states as treaty law. Such 
law “crystallises” upon the confluence of two factors: the objective element of 
state practice (usus), and the subjective element of opinio juris sive necessitatis.76 As 
noted by the ICJ in the Asylum case: 
“The party which relies on custom…must prove that this custom is established 
in such a manner that it has become binding on the other party…that the rule 
invoked…is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage, practiced by the 
States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to 
the State…and a duty incumbent on [the other State].”77
Objectively, this is a high threshold. Subjectively, as this is unwritten law 
developed through an informal process, it is very difficult to definitively 
establish when crystallisation has occurred and to delineate its precise contours. 
For reasons that will be explained, this is particularly so with regard to nascent 
activities such as cyber operations. 
The first prong of the test, state practice, includes both physical and verbal acts 
of states.78 To qualify as state practice, the conduct in question must generally 
occur over an extended period of time. The classic illustration is the 1900 US 
Supreme Court case, The Paquete Habana, in which the court looked into the 
practice of numerous countries over a period measured in centuries to conclude 
that fishing vessels were exempt from capture by belligerents during an armed 
conflict.79 
74 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. 
IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227. This 
was the finding of the Nuremburg Tribunal. International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, 
Case of the Major War Criminals, Judgment, October 1, 1946, I Official Documents 253-54.
75 See generally Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Interaction between Customary International Law and 
Treaties’, 322 Recueil des Cours 383 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007).
76 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 ICJ. 3, paras. 71, 77 (Feb. 20); 
Continental Shelf case (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 27 ( June 3); Nicaragua, supra note 54, 
para. 183.
77 Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (November 20).
78 See, e.g., International Law Association, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of 
Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation 
of General Customary International Law, 13 ff. (2000) [hereinafter ILA Report]; I Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, xxxviii-xxxix ( Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-
Beck, eds., 2005).
79 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 686-700 (1900).
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This temporal condition has deteriorated over time. As an example, in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ, in dealing with the customary law of the sea, 
held that “passage of only a short time is not necessarily a bar…[if state practice], 
including that of states whose interests are specially affected [is] both extensive 
and virtually uniform.”80 Perhaps the best illustration of the weakening of 
the requirement of long-term practice is the development of customary space 
law,81 an example that suggests that the relative novelty of cyber operations 
does not necessarily preclude the rapid emergence of cyber-specific customary 
international law. 
The state practice essential to establishing customary law must, even if of limited 
duration, be consistent. When there are significant deviations from a practice by 
states, which may include both engaging in an activity and refraining from one, a 
customary norm cannot materialise. Although minor infrequent inconsistencies 
do not constitute a bar to such emergence,82 repeated inconsistencies generally 
have to be characterised by other states as violations of the norm in question 
before a customary norm can be said to exist. 83 For instance, it is clear that 
the prohibition on the use of force set out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
constitutes a customary norm;84 yet states have historically engaged in the use of 
force and continue to do so today. The saving factor is that when they do, their 
conduct is, absent the justification of self-defence, typically styled by other states 
as wrongful.
There is no set formula as to the number of states that must engage in a practice 
before a norm crystallises, although the greater the density of practice, the 
more convincing the argument that crystallisation has occurred.85 Of particular 
importance is the diversity of the states involved on issues such as their 
geopolitics and legal systems,86 and the fact that “specially affected states” have 
engaged in the practice or expressed their view of such practice when engaged 
80 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 76, para. 74.
81 For an early, and classic, treatment of the subject, see Myres S. McDougal, ‘The Emerging 
Customary Law of Space’, 58 Northwestern University Law Review 618 (1963-1964): 618-42.
82 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (December 18).
83 “In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the 
conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of state 
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that 
rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.” Nicaragua, supra note 54, para. 186.
84 Id, paras. 188-190.
85 Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 78, at xlii-xliv.
86 Id., xliv.
The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms
24
in by other states.87 A specially affected state is one upon which the norm will 
operate with particular resonance. As an example, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) has opined that “specially affected states” with respect 
to the legality of weapons include “those identified as having been in the process 
of developing such weapons.”88 In cyberspace, the United States would qualify 
as a “specially affected state” in light of its centrality to cyber activities and its 
development of military capacity in the field.
The term “opinio juris” refers to the requirement that a state engage in a practice, 
or refrain from it, out of a sense of legal obligation.89 In other words, the state 
must believe that its actions are required or prohibited by international law. It 
is often the case that a state’s behaviour is motivated by other factors, such 
as policy, security, operational, economic and even moral considerations. For 
instance, Estonia actively seeks to maintain a clean cyber environment. It does 
so, not because it believes that the international legal requirement of “due 
diligence” requires such measures, but rather for cyber security reasons such as 
to prevent the establishment and use of botnets in the country. Such practices 
have no bearing on the creation of a customary law norm.
The fact that various norms converge to govern state conduct makes it necessary 
to deconstruct state practice to determine whether a state is acting out of a sense of 
legal obligation or is instead motivated by ethical or policy concerns. Obviously, 
it is often difficult to ascertain the rationale underlying a particular practice; 
care must be taken in drawing inferences as to opinio juris based solely on the 
existence of state practice.90 For instance, the ICRC cited many military manuals 
as evidence of opinio juris in its 2005 Customary International Humanitarian 
Law study.91 In response, the United States objected that the provisions found 
in military manuals were often as much the product of operational and policy 
choice as legal obligation.92 A similar criticism frequently attends the citation of 
87 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 76, para. 74; ILA Report, supra note 78, 25-26.
88 Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 78, at xliv.
89 S.S. Lotus, supra note 12, at 28; North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 76, para. 77; Nicaragua, supra 
note 54, para. 185 (citing). 
90 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 76, paras. 76-77.
91 Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 78, at xxxviii. See also Prosecutor v. Tadić; 
Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
para. 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia October 2, 1995).
92 Letter to Jakob Kellinberger, ICRC, from John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, U.S. 
Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, respectively, U.S. Initial Reactions 
to ICRC Study on Customary International Law, November 3, 2006, http://2001-2009.state.
gov/s/l/rls/82630.htm.
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UN General Assembly resolutions as support for the existence of a customary 
norm, because states can vote in favour of such legally non-binding instruments 
for purely political reasons. The point is that when the basis for a practice or 
assertion is unclear, it does not comprise the requisite opinio juris.
Despite this difficulty, states do engage in conduct and issue statements that 
clearly indicate their characterisation of certain practices as required (or not) 
by customary international law. As an example, although the United States is 
a party to neither the Law of the Sea Convention nor Additional Protocol I, it 
often confirms that it views certain provisions of those instruments as reflective 
of customary international law.93 
Once a customary norm has emerged, it is applicable to all states, including 
those that did not participate in the practice that led to its crystallisation. Such 
norms are even binding on states that are created after the customary norm 
has developed.94 However, there are a number of exceptions to this general 
principle. In particular, a state may “persistently object” to the norm’s formation 
as it is emerging. If the norm nevertheless emerges, the persistent objector is 
arguably not bound by it.95 In this regard, the role of “specially affected states” 
is paramount.96 It would be very unlikely that a customary norm could emerge 
over the objection of such a state. For example, given the military wherewithal 
of the United States, and its frequent involvement in armed conflicts, it would 
be difficult for an IHL cyber norm to materialise in the face of a US objection 
thereto. Fortunately, assertions of persistent objection are infrequent; rather, 
disagreement regarding customary norms typically surrounds the scope of a 
rule, not its existence. 
In certain limited circumstances, a customary norm may be regional or even 
local in character. To illustrate, in the Asylum case, the ICJ found that a regional 
customary norm applied in Latin America,97 whereas in the Rights of Passage it 
determined that another existed between two states with respect to passage 
93 Department of the Navy and Department of Homeland Security, The Commander’s Handbook 
on the Law of Naval Operations, para. 1-2, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB 
P5800.7A, 2007; The United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 
Law of Armed Conflict Documentary Supplement 232-33 (2013), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Documentary-Supplement-2013.pdf.
94 ILA Report, supra note 78, at 24-25.
95 Id. at 27-29. The doctrine of persistent objection is not universally accepted. Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, supra note 78, at xlv.
96 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 76, para. 74.
97 Asylum Case, supra note 77, at 276-77.
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across India to Portuguese enclaves in that state.98 It is foreseeable that regional 
norms might develop for cyber activities, particularly where states of a region 
are similarly situated in that regard, as in the case of Europe.
Customary International Law in the Cyber Context
Many obstacles lie in the path of customary norm emergence vis-à-vis cyberspace. 
The requirement of practice over time hinders this process to an extent, but is not 
fatal because contemporary customary international law appears to countenance 
relatively rapid crystallisation. A much greater impediment is the visibility of 
cyber activities. It is difficult to “see” what goes on in cyberspace. Instead, 
the effects of cyber operations are often all that is publicly observed; in fact, 
sometimes even the effects are not apparent to the general public. Therefore, 
it can be difficult to point to a particular state’s cyber practice to support an 
argument that a norm has emerged. States, including victim states, may be 
reticent in revealing their knowledge of a cyber operation, because doing so 
may disclose capabilities that they deem essential to their security. Undisclosed 
acts cannot, as a practical matter, amount to state practice contributing to the 
emergence of customary international law.99 
Similarly, states will frequently hesitate to offer opinions regarding the legality of 
state practice in cyberspace. For instance, a state may be unwilling to definitively 
articulate a threshold for “armed attack”.100 This could be because it does not 
want its opponents to discern when it is likely to respond on the basis of the right 
of self-defence, or because it prefers not to clarify the “use of force” threshold as 
doing so might limit its own options in the future. In other words, it may view 
strategic ambiguity as in its national interest. From an international security 
perspective, normative clarity is not always helpful. 
Two recent examples are illustrative. The relative silence of states in reaction 
to the 2010 Stuxnet operation against Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges 
does not necessarily indicate that states believe that the operation was lawful 
(assuming for the sake of analysis that it was launched by other states, since only 
98 Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, p. 37 (April 12).
99 Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 78, at xl; ILA Report, supra note 78, 15.
100 As an example, at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the Alliance’s Heads of State and 
Government decided that “A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation 
of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.” – Wales 
Summit Declaration, Sept. 5, 2014, pt. 72, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_112964.htm.
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states can violate the prohibition on the use of force set forth in Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter). On the contrary, they may have concluded that the attack 
violated the prohibition on the use of force because it was not in response to an 
Iranian armed attack pursuant to the treaty and customary law of self-defence. 
Yet those states may logically have decided that the operation was nevertheless a 
sensible means of avoiding a pre-emptive and destabilising kinetic attack against 
the facilities by Israel. Similarly, the 2012 Shamoon virus targeting Saudi Arabia’s 
national oil company’s computers may also have been considered a violation of 
the prohibition of the use of force, if it was conducted, as has been speculated, 
by Iran.101 Despite this possibility, the relative downplaying by states of the legal 
aspects in particular, as well as the entire incident in general, may be attributable 
to concerns regarding the economic consequences of publicly discussing the 
grave consequences or the perpetrator of the operation. 
It is also common for states to support or condemn a cyber activity in their 
international rhetoric, but not be specific as to whether the condemnation is 
based on customary international law or on other considerations, such as moral 
principles or political concerns. The PRISM surveillance programme serves as an 
example on point. While many states, including Germany and France, criticised 
the surveillance programme, with the former stating that these practices were 
“completely unacceptable”102 and the latter that they “cannot accept this kind of 
behaviour from partners and allies,”103 the comments do not necessarily confirm 
their position on the legality of the programme.
Other requirements that will often be difficult to meet in regard to cyber state 
practice are consistency and density. For instance, Brazil argued at the UN 
General Assembly in 2013 that the interception of communications represents 
“a case of disrespect to the [country’s] national sovereignty,”104 presumably 
suggesting that it breaches the international law principle of sovereignty. It is 
unlikely that a sufficient number of other states, in particular specially affected 
states, will embrace the same position to the extent that the criteria of a 
101 Nicole Perlroth, ‘In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. Sees Iran Firing Back’, New York Times, 
Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-
oil-firm-disquiets-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
102 ‘Merkel Calls Obama about ‘US Spying on Her Phone’’, BBC, Oct. 23, 2013, http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-us-canada-24647268. 
103 ‘Hollande: Bugging Allegations Threaten EU-US Trade Pact’, BBC, July 1, 2013, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23125451.
104 Statement by Brazilian President H. E. Dilma Rousseff on September 24, 2013 at the Opening 
of the General Debate of the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Translated 
reprint at 2, http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf.
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customary norm will be satisfied. 
Indeed, as noted above with regard to treaties, states may be conflicted regarding 
what legal position to take on cyber customary norms. As a result, they may 
take no position on the legality of a particular cyber practice until they fully 
understand the position’s costs and benefits. And, of course, states will want 
to avoid being criticised for adopting a “do as I say, not as I do” approach. The 
United States, rightly or wrongly, has been the subject of such accusations with 
regard to its condemnation of Chinese cyber operations against United States 
businesses.105
Finally, state comments regarding their own or other states’ activities tend to be 
drafted by non-lawyers. The legal dimension of the activities is accordingly often 
neglected. The paradigmatic examples were the US public statements regarding 
possible operations against Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003, which focused on 
Iraq’s alleged involvement in transnational terrorism and its development of 
weapons of mass destruction capability.106 By the time the US finally set out 
its formal legal justification – a very nuanced interpretation of ceasefire law107 
– it had been rendered inaudible against the on-going geopolitical brouhaha 
that was underway. As this example demonstrates, international security matters 
generally take on policy and strategic hues, rather than legal ones. The same is 
proving to be true as states engage in and react to cyber activities.
Considered in concert, these factors render improbable the rapid crystallisation 
of new customary norms to govern cyberspace. Therefore, the normative impact 
of customary law on cyber conflict is most likely to take place in the guise of 
interpretation of existing customary norms, and if so, interpretive dilemmas 
similar to those affecting treaty interpretation will surface. In fact, the obstacles 
will be greater with respect to customary international law, because not only are 
the rules themselves not expressly articulated, but there are also no explicit rules 
regarding their interpretation such as those found in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. 
105 See, e.g., ‘China Denounces US Cyber-theft Charges’, BBC, May 20, 2014, http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-us-canada-27477601.
106 Address of President George W. Bush, March 19, 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html.
107 Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2003/351, March 21, 2003.
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General Principles of Law in the Cyber Context
The third formal source of international legal norms cited in Article 38 
of the International Court of Justice’s Statute is general principles of law. A 
complicating factor with respect to this source is that its nature is the subject of 
some controversy.108 Generally, the term is said to refer to a number of types of 
legal principles that are: common across domestic legal systems, such as the use 
of circumstantial evidence;109 evident from the nature of law itself, for instance 
res judicata (final judgments of a court are conclusive);110 derive from the nature of 
international law, such as pacta sunt sevanda (“agreements must be kept”);111 and 
based on fairness, prominent examples being equity112 and estoppel.113
General principles are most likely to become relevant when disputes between 
states over cyber matters arise. As an example, in the celebrated Chorzow Factory 
case, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that the breach of an 
obligation in international law necessarily gives rise to the obligation to make 
reparations,114 a principle echoed in the International Law Commission’s 
Articles of State Responsibility.115 Thus, if a state’s cyber operations violate the 
sovereignty of another state and cause harm, the former will be obligated to 
make reparations to the latter. Similarly, courts may decide cases in part based 
on equitable considerations. Such a decision might be appropriate, for instance, 
in the case of cyber infrastructure which is shared by states.
However, at times a general principle of law may reflect a substantive obligation. 
The classic example is the International Court of Justice’s identification of 
the principle that every State shoulders an “obligation not to allow knowingly 
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”116 This 
108 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 98 (6th ed. 2008); Oscar Schachter, International Law in 
Theory and Practice 50–55 (1991). 
109 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ. 4, at 18 (Apr. 9).
110 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. 
Serb. and Montenegro), 2007 ICJ. 43, para. 113 (Feb. 26).
111 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 26; AMCO v. Republic of 
Indonesia, 89 Int’l L. Rep. 366, 495-97 (1992). 
112 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 76, paras. 98-99; Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd. 
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ. 3, para. 94 (Feb. 5); Frontier Dispute (Burkino Faso v. Mali), 1986 ICJ 554, 
para. 149 (Dec. 22).
113 Temple case, 1962 ICJ 6, 23, 31; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), 2002 ICJ. 275, para. 57 (Oct. 10).
114 Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 PCIJ., (ser. A) No. 13, at 28.
115 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, part 2, ch. II.
116 Corfu Channel, supra note 109, at 22. 
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pronouncement, which is now universally accepted, was the basis for Tallinn 
Manual Rule 5: “A State shall not knowingly allow the cyber infrastructure 
located in its territory or under its exclusive governmental control to be used for 
acts that adversely and unlawfully affect other States.”117
Conclusion
Legal norms are but one facet of the normative environment in which cyber 
operations exist. To suggest that they alone suffice would be folly. After all, 
there is a scarcity of cyber-specific treaty law and a near total void of cyber-
specific customary law on the subject. As a result, recourse must be had to 
general international law and the interpretation thereof in the cyber context. Of 
course, any interpretive endeavour is plagued with uncertainty and ambiguity, 
especially when engaged in with respect to novel activities such as cyber 
operations. This lack of legal normative clarity invites states to take differing 
interpretive positions. A state’s objective view of the law may drive the legal 
position it adopts; however, it would be naïve to deny that policy and ethical 
influences have an effect on such determinations. 
Controversy and inexactitude will surely characterise this process, which will 
be neither linear nor logical. The weakening of the early Russian and Chinese 
objections to the application of extant international law to cyberspace is a 
milestone in this regard. Yet, while both states have backed away from their 
opening stance on the issue, it remains unclear where they stand today. Other 
states such as the United States and the Netherlands are beginning to show a 
willingness to articulate their positions on how current international law applies 
in cyberspace. Nonetheless, the public pronouncements to date have been vague, 
probably intentionally so. 
Despite the attention that cyber activities have drawn in the past decade, the 
conclusion of new treaties or the crystallisation of new customary law norms to 
govern them is doubtful. Opposition from western states is particularly marked 
to the former, at least.118 Instead, the application and interpretative evolution of 
117 Tallinn Manual, supra note 5, r. 5.
118 See, e.g., President of the United States, International Strategy for Cyberspace, May 15, 2011, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_
cyberspace.pdf; Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 15, Doc. JOIN (2013) 1 
final, February 7, 2013.
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existing international law is the most likely near-term prospect. As to customary 
law, although it may sometimes develop rapidly, “usually customary law is too 
slow a means of adapting the law to fast-changing circumstances.”119
Consequently, the work of scholars such as the International Group of Experts 
who prepared the Tallinn Manual, and those who are engaged in the follow-on 
“Tallinn 2.0” project, is likely to prove especially influential. This dynamic 
is appropriate since, as noted in Article 38 of the International Court of 
Justice’s Statute, the work of scholars is a secondary source of law that informs 
identification and application of primary sources. But this reality is certainly less 
than optimal, because states, and only states, enjoy the formal authority to make 
international law. Unless they wish to surrender their interpretive prerogative to 
academia, it is incumbent upon them to engage with cyber issues more openly 
and more aggressively. 
In this patchwork and nebulous environment, the role of other normative 
regimes looms large. Only in exceptional circumstances may their dictates cross 
the international law border. However, where those boundaries are indistinct, 
common policy or ethical norms may operate to define the outer boundaries 
of acceptable conduct in cyber space. Because cyber activities are a relatively 
new phenomenon, policy and ethical norms may serve to carve out more 
restrictive boundaries than international laws which are designed to constrain 
the other activities of states. Over time, these non-legal norms may mature 
through codification into treaty law or crystallise into customary law, such that 
they formally define the limits of cyber activities. In the meantime, cyberspace 
will remain an environment of fervent, and often multi-directional, normative 
development. 
119 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 9, at 30.
